Men's Beliefs and Women's Ballots*

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June 26, 2026

Abstract

In many societies, men exert control over women's actions across social, economic, and political domains. We study whether this control extends to voting, where the secret ballot is designed to protect voter autonomy. In a pre-registered field experiment in rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, we provide incentivized evidence that men severely underestimate the alignment between their own vote choices and those of women in their communities. We then show that randomly correcting these misperceptions about vote alignment nearly doubles women's election-day turnout from a low baseline of 14.4 percent. We also show and correct norm misperceptions around whether women should vote, and find that turnout effects are similar in magnitude, suggesting that men's strategic control may play as large a role as norms in shaping women's political participation. Using an incentivized task, we document that correcting alignment and norm misperceptions increases the chance that men allow women to make their own political decisions. Our findings establish that belief-based constraints represent actionable barriers to women's political participation.

JEL Codes: D72, D83, J16, O12

Keywords: political participation, social norms, information interventions, gender, voting

*We thank Ernesto Dal Bo, Dan Roggers, Ted Miguel, Rob Metcalfe, Eliana La Ferrara, and participants at NEUDC and Pitt Medley for useful comments and suggestions. Isabella Gupta and Mamoor Ali Khan provided excellent research assistance. The project benefited from funding provided by Behavioral Economics Design Initiative at Pitt, International Growth Centre, and Stanford King Center on Global Development.

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1 Introduction

In many societies around the world, men exert control over women's actions across social, economic, political, and personal domains (Jayachandran and Voena 2026). Women may be expected to seek permission from male relatives before traveling, pursuing higher education, or accepting paid employment. These patterns of control are often sustained not only by formal rules, but also by social norms and intra-household power dynamics that shape women's autonomy in everyday decisions. One such domain is politics. Political participation is a consequential sphere of agency because it determines whose preferences are represented in public policy and, in turn, shapes the allocation of resources and rights within society (Gottlieb et al. 2016; Khan 2017; Bleck and Michelitch 2018; Brule and Gaikwad 2020).

The extension of women's suffrage in the twentieth century marked a major institutional shift, granting women the formal right to vote. Yet suffrage did not necessarily eliminate male control over women's political decisions. For men accustomed to delivering bloc votes to local politicians or acting as intermediaries between the household and the state, women's independent voting could represent a loss of political influence. Politicians, in turn, may have strategically focused mobilization efforts on male household heads, reinforcing patterns in which men control and restrict women's political participation.

In this paper, we test whether men restrict women's political participation because they believe women's votes may diverge from their own. If men expect political disagreement within the household, they may have incentives to monitor, accompany, or discourage women's voting in order to preserve household political influence. By experimentally correcting men's misperceptions about women's political alignment, we test whether belief-driven concerns shape the extent to which men exert control over women's political choices.

We study this question in rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, a socially conservative province where women's political participation remains markedly low despite universal adult suffrage. Women's turnout in many areas has lagged far behind men's, and in some cases has approached the constitutional minimum of ten percent required for electoral validity. These patterns make the setting well-suited to studying how men's power and influence shape women's political participation.

We combine a pre-registered field experiment with surveys to first provide incentivized evidence that men in our sample severely underestimate concordance between the vote choices of men and women in their communities. We then show that randomly correcting these beliefs about vote alignment between men and women nearly doubles the election day turnout of women from their own households. Second, we also show and correct norm misperceptions around whether women *should* vote, and find that the turnout result on correcting the vote alignment misperception is similar in magnitude to correcting beliefs around norms directly. This suggests that men's strategic control may play as large a role as norms in shaping women's political life. Third, using an incentivized task, we show that correcting alignment (and norm) misperceptions increases the chance that men allow women to make their own political decisions, suggesting male control in the household is an important impediment to women's political participation.

The paper makes three contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on intra-household decision-making and the determinants of women's power within the household

(Jayachandran and Voena 2026).[1] A common thread in this work is that men restrict women's autonomy when they anticipate that women, if left to decide freely, would make choices that diverge from men's own preferences. Our focus is on politics, where voting presents a theoretically ambiguous case for this logic. The secret ballot introduces plausible deniability that attenuates the strategic rationale for restricting how women vote, since men cannot verify their voting choices. Yet we show that men can and do control the extensive margin of voting: whether women vote at all. Ours is thus the first evidence on strategic control of preference expression in politics.

Second, we contribute to a growing literature on misperceptions about others (Bursztyn and Yang 2022; La Ferrara and Yanagizawa-Drott 2026).[2] Experimental corrections of these misperceptions generally succeed in updating beliefs, but translating them into behavioral change has proven more difficult, where effects are often small or short-lived. We study voting, where misperceptions about others have received little attention, and show that misperceptions surrounding both preference alignment and community norms shape women's turnout. Our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to show that misperception-corrections move real turnout for women. The persuasion rate of this correction is similar to those in information and media-exposure experiments surveyed in DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010).

Third, we contribute to a growing literature on women's agency and political participation in developing countries (Anderson 2024; Jayachandran 2015). The question of why women's political participation remains so low even where suffrage is universal has been examined through multiple channels: quotas and reserved seats for women (Pande 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Bhavnani 2008), low aspirations and the scarcity of role models (Beaman et al. 2012), weaknesses in the pipeline of female candidates (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Foos and Gilardi 2019), the absence of women's political networks (Giné and Mansuri 2018; Prillaman 2023), and male gatekeeping (Cheema et al. 2023). We provide evidence of an under-examined belief-based explanation: the possibility that women's low participation reflects correctable misperceptions held by the men who control women's access to the ballot. Our results highlight that belief-based constraints represent actionable barriers to women's political agency.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, including baseline belief elicitation, treatment delivery, randomization, endline data collection, and balance. Section 3 presents the main results on men's beliefs, women's voter turnout, and intra-household political decision-making. Section 4 examines heterogeneous treatment effects by women's empowerment and other baseline characteristics. Section 5 concludes.

[1] A growing body of experimental evidence documents that men exert control over women's choices across a wide range of domains: labor force participation (Heath and Tan 2020; Lowe and McKelway 2025; Kala and McKelway 2025; Field et al. 2021; Sanin 2025), savings and financial decisions (Ashraf 2009), fertility (Ashraf et al. 2014), and children's human capital investments (Björkman Nyqvist and Jayachandran 2017).

[2] A large body of work documents that people systematically misperceive others' attitudes, characteristics, and behaviors across a range of domains: the composition of immigrant populations (Alesina et al. 2018), income and relative position in the distribution (Cruces et al. 2013), partisan political opinions (Ahler and Sood 2018), health behaviors such as vaccination and compliance with public health protocols (Karing 2021; Allen IV et al. 2023), protest participation (Cantoni et al. 2019), and campaign organization (Hager et al. 2023).

2 Experimental design

We implemented our study around the 2024 General Elections in Pakistan which were held on February 8th. The study is conduced in three phases. In the first phase, started on January 18, we collect primary baseline beliefs on vote alignment and norms related to women's voting. This allows us to calculate misalignment in beliefs. In the second phase, that occurred before the elections, we return to respondents and randomize the provision of correct information. Elections occur before the final phase where we measure outcomes. We provide details of these phases of fieldwork below. Figure 2 shows an overview of the design at each phase of the study.

2.1 Baseline Beliefs and their Misperception

We implement this study within 36 villages in north-western Pakistan. Within each village, we implemented a geographic randomization to sample households. For each village, we first identified a central landmark, typically a mosque, a school, or a local organization's office location. We then drew random geo-pins within 190 meters around this landmark and shared the corresponding latitude and longitude with enumerators. At the start of the survey, enumerators loaded the assigned coordinates on their phones and proceeded to the pin location. If the pin fell on a dwelling, the survey was conducted in that household. If it did not, enumerators turned back toward the original landmark and selected the first un-contacted dwelling on the right.

For the baseline survey, we randomly sample 2593 households across 36 villages in District Charsadda and collect beliefs through in-person private surveys with one male and one female respondent per household. Respondents are interviewed separately by enumerators of their respective genders. The specific respondents in the household are identified by asking for the male and female decision-makers.

We measure beliefs on vote alignment and norms as follows:

1. **Beliefs about Vote Alignment:** We ask each respondent how many women they think (out of 10 in the village) vote for the same electoral candidate as men.[3]

   To calculate the magnitude of misbelief, we use the voting records from the 2018 General Elections in District Charsadda. Using voting data from male and female polling stations[4] where only voters of respective genders are allowed to vote, and then calculate the correlation between the ranking of candidates among male and female voters.

[3]The exact question asks: "Out of 10 women, how many women from your village do you think vote for the same candidate/party as the men?" This question is incentivzed: respondents are told "Since we'll know the correct answer, if your answer is close to it we'll enter your name in a lottery where we randomly select one person to receive a prize of Rs. 500." Payment for all correct answers was disbursed after the endline.

[4]Using the polling-station data for the 51 settlements in our frame, 28,405 male voters and 18,424 female voters, or 88.2 percent of male voters and 90.8 percent of female voters, voted at polling stations that were not coded as combined. By contrast, 3,790 male voters and 1,879 female voters, or 11.8 percent of male voters and 9.3 percent of female voters, voted at polling stations coded as combined. Importantly, this does not mean that men and women voted in mixed booths. Polling booths were always gender segregated from the voter's perspective. What we code as a combined polling station simply refers to cases where male and female booths were located within the same school or compound.

We find a correlation of 0.96, which we interpret as near perfect alignment between candidate choices of male and female voters. Using this information, we set the true number of women (out of 10 women) in the village who vote for the same candidate as men at 10. The difference between this true number and the response of the individual to our question gives us the magnitude of misbelief about vote alignment between the candidate choices of men and women. Figure 1 panel (a) shows the distribution of this wedge where a 87 percent of the respondents strongly underestimated the alignment in candidate choice between men and women.

2. **Beliefs about Norms:** The respondents are also asked whether they support women's right to vote or not.[5] Using the answers of male respondents, we calculate how many men out of 10 in the village privately support women's right to vote.

   Next, we ask respondents to predict the number of men (out of 10 men) in the village who support women's right to vote.[6] This later question is used as the individual's belief about norms in the village. The difference between each individual's belief about men in the village and the actual support scaled to 10 gives us the magnitude of misbelief about norms supporting women voting for each individual man and woman in our sample. Figure 1 panel (b) shows the distribution of this wedge, indicating that 73 percent of the respondents in the village are pessimistic about the norms around women's right to vote.

Besides beliefs and demographics, the baseline survey also included questions on women empowerment and household political participation which we use for heterogeneity analysis.

2.2 Administering Treatments

Having established that there is considerable misperception in beliefs on vote alignment and norms, we proceed to the second phase of fieldwork where we design an experiment to correct these misbeliefs.

2.2.1 Experimental Sample

The distribution of misperception in Figure 1 shows that all respondents are weakly pessimistic about vote alignment between men and women (panel a), and a significant proportion have strong pessimistic beliefs about norms (panel b). The experimental sample, households who can randomly receive belief correction treatments, therefore comprises those where both male and female respondents are strongly pessimistic about other men's support for women voting ($N = 1,582$). This choice of the experimental sample reflects ethical concerns about correcting optimistic norm misbeliefs (comprising those respondents whose beliefs about others support for women voting are higher than the true support in the village) as doing so may depress women's turnout.

[5]The exact question asks: "On a scale of 1 to 5, how much do you agree with the statement, "If women want, they have the right to vote"". We code any responses of 4 and above as agreement with the statement.

[6]This question is also incentivized. Respondents are told that if their answer is close to the true village average calculated after the survey, their name will be entered in a lottery of PKR 500 which will be won by one randomly selected person.

This experimental sample is referred to as the strongly pessimistic sample in our Pre-analysis Plan, where we experimentally correct misbeliefs about both alignment and norms.[7] We also pre-registered a belief correction experiment on the remaining norm weakly optimistic sample (N=1,011), where we only correct misbeliefs around vote alignment. Randomization was conducted independently for both experiments. The results from this second experiment are consistent with those we show below, and are presented in Appendix J.

2.2.2 Treatments delivery

Having established belief misperceptions via the baseline, we proceed to the treatment stage of the project. Our survey teams return to the field and find the same male and female respondents in each household who were surveyed at baseline.[8]] A new survey is administered to these individuals that includes a module on treatments as well as a post-treatment outcome module. Respondents in the control group are similarly contacted but only receive the post-treatment outcome module.

In treatment households, respondents are first reminded of their baseline responses to the questions about vote alignment between men and women, and also the number of men in the village who support women voting. They are then informed about the true alignment in voting and the true average number of men in the village who support women voting depending on the treatment randomization we discuss below. For each treatment, the information is conveyed visually by showing a number of blank and colored faces on a digital mobile device and verbally explained by the enumerators. We show robustness to enumeration pair fixed effects in Appendix K.3.

2.2.3 Randomization

Treatments are assigned at the household level which means that both male and female respondents receive the same treatment information. However, like the baseline survey, each respondent is treated privately by the enumerator of their respective gender. See Figure 2 for details. Households are randomized between three treatments (Alignment, Norms, or Both) and one control condition.[9] We now describe these treatments.

- **Alignment:** Respondents in this treatment condition are informed about the real alignment in candidate vote choice between male and female voters. As discussed above, the information is scaled to 10, so we inform the treated subjects that 10 out of 10 women vote for the same candidate as men.

[7]We pre-registered our experiment with AEA. We adhere closely to the pre-registration in the analysis that follows. Deviations relate to analysis of extra outcomes that we explicitly note below. These deviations from the pre-analysis plan in detail in Appendix A. Link to pre-registration: `https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12898-1.0`

[8]The recontact rate at the household level is 95.8 percent. The randomization is at the household level and was conducted on the full baseline experimental level. We report ITT estimates below with IV estimates in Appendix K.2.

[9]The weakly optimistic sample was independently randomized to receive only the Alignment treatment (as discussed above) or a control condition.

- **Norms:** Respondents in this treatment condition are told the average number of men in this community (scaled to 10) who agree with the statement "If women want, they have the right to vote"". As the experimental sample is strongly pessimistic the treatment is always in the direction of other men being more permissive than the respondents initial beliefs.
- **Both:** Households in this condition receive both the alignment and norms treatment.
- **Control:** This group does not receive any treatment information, but is contacted in the same way as the treatment groups.

2.3 Endline data collection

In addition to outcomes collected at the time of the treatment, we return to the field after the election to collect data on the primary pre-registered outcome: whether women in the experimental sample voted in the election or not. Election regulations in Pakistan require that anyone who votes in the election gets an indelible ink mark on their thumbnail. We use this requirement to collect objective information on whether women voted or not.[10] Female members of our survey teams visit the sampled households between one and three days after the election and checked for indelible ink marks on the thumbnails of the main female respondents and other women in the households..[11] Women who do not have this mark are considered to have not voted and are asked for reasons for not voting. Our teams are able to collect the voting outcomes for women in 1552 households, representing 98.1 percent of the experimental sample.

2.4 Balance and Summary Statistics

We sample 1,582 households for experiment 1 and 1,011 households for experiment 2. These households earn on average Rs. 11,366 and Rs. 11,997 per month, respectively. We check for balance across eight household level characteristics and fifteen characteristics at the level of female respondents across the two samples separately by testing if treatment assignment is orthogonal to these co-variates. Out of 168 balance tests performed on the sample of experiment 1, we find only 14 to be significant. Appendix sections C and D report the summary statistics and balance tables, respectively.

3 Results

3.1 Estimation

We estimate treatment effects by running a regression using the following equations:

$$Y_{ihb} = Alignment_{hb} + Norms_{hb} + Both_{hb} + \eta_b + \varepsilon_{ihb} \quad (1)$$

[10] Previous work has also used this ink mark to measure turnout (Cheema et al. 2023).

[11] We were able to collect these data for roughly 65 percent of households on day 1. The remaining households were reached on day 2. On day 3, our teams revisited households that had not been found during the first two visits in order to complete the sample as fully as possible.

where Y is the outcome for individual i in household h and randomization block b. η_b is a vector of block fixed effects.

We use heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors for most models that look at individual level outcomes and cluster standard errors at the household level in models where outcomes for multiple individuals in a household are analyzed.

3.2 Effects on men's beliefs about female voter turnout

We first study if the information about alignment helps the respondent update their beliefs. Instead of asking the respondents to restate the information that was provided to them, we ask for beliefs about turnout of women voters. We find that as a result of the all treatments the distribution of men's beliefs about turnout significantly shift rightward. Figure 3 plots the distribution of men's beliefs about turnout for each treatment condition and the control for both experiments. The figure also reports p-values from Kolmogorov-Simrnov test of the quality of the distributions. In all cases, we can reject the null that post treatment administration the distribution of beliefs are similar between the treatment condition and the control condition. This result provides evidence that the treatments help men update their beliefs about women's political actions.

3.3 Effects on female voter turnout

Table 1 presents the effects of the experiment on the main pre-registered outcome: women's voting. This outcome is collected through a post-election survey for the women respondents in the households. The outcome is coded as 1 if the enumerator found indelible ink mark, a proof of voting, on the thumb of the respondent and zero otherwise.

Column 1 reports the effect of the treatments on the likelihood that the main female respondent voted in the election. There are four important results to consider. First, in the status quo, the likelihood of women voting is only 14.4 percent. This rate of voting is slightly above the minimum female turnout requirement of 10%, as set in the constitution. This low turnout rate supports the view that women rarely participate in political activities.

Second, correcting beliefs about the alignment between the candidate choices of men and women increases the likelihood that women vote by 10.9 percentage points. This result suggests that at least some women who would otherwise want to vote cannot because of the misperception that women may vote for candidates that are not favored by men.

Third, correcting the misperception about the norms of women voting also results in a higher turnout of women by 10.2 percentage points. Since restrictive norms are often considered the reason behind women's lack of participation in politics, this result suggests that providing correct information and removing misperception may help relax some of the constraints posed by conservative norms.

Fourth, and last, correcting misperception in beliefs about alignment between candidate choice and about norms governing women voting also results in higher turnout (13.1 percentage points). Given the positive effect of the combined treatment on turnout, we test for additive complementarity of correcting beliefs about alignment and social norms but find the two are not additively complementary. We reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on

both treatments is the same as the sum of the effects of alignment and norms individual treatments (p−value = 0.017), as shown in the second panel of Table 1.

Persuasion rate. To benchmark the magnitude of our treatment effects, we compute the persuasion rate proposed by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and discussed in DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). The persuasion rate measures the fraction of individuals whose behavior could have been changed by the intervention who were in fact moved to act. Formally,

$$f = 100 \times \frac{y_T - y_C}{e_T - e_C} \times \frac{1}{1 - y_0}, \tag{2}$$

where $y_T - y_C$ is the intent-to-treat effect on women's turnout, $e_T - e_C$ is the difference in the share of individuals effectively exposed to the treatment message between the treatment and control groups, and y_0 is the baseline turnout rate in the control group. The first ratio adjusts the reduced-form effect for the actual exposure differential between treatment and control; the second term rescales the effect as a share of the population at risk of being persuaded—that is, women who were not already voting $(1 - y_0)$. In our setting, the intervention was expected to be delivered to 100% of the treated households and no one from the control. However, some treated households could not be reached on the day of the treatment administration, resulting in a less than 100% rate. The relevant treatments were received by 95.7% of the households in the alignment group, 96.7% of the households in the norms group, and 95.96% of the households in the group receiving both interventions. Appendix provides a detailed breakdown of the attrition numbers. Using the control-group turnout rate of $y_0 = 0.144$, the persuasion rate, using equation 2, is 13.3% for the treatment correcting beliefs about alignment between men and women, 123.% for the treatment correcting beliefs about norms, and 15.9% for the combined treatment receiving correct information about both types of beliefs.

Our persuasion rates are in line with DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) who survey 24 estimates across studies of consumers, voters, donors, and investors, reporting a median persuasion rate of 7.95% overall and 11.5% among voter persuasion studies. Our estimates of 12.3–15.9% fall above the voter-study median but within the range documented in this literature. The slightly high rates reflect two features of our setting: the intervention targets a specific and actionable belief, men's misperceptions about vote alignment and community norms, and the baseline rate of the target behavior is low, leaving correspondingly more room for persuasion.

3.4 Effects on Independence of Women's Political Decisions

The change in women voter turnout after the households were treated is likely driven by changes in men's control over women's decision making. In this section, we provide evidence that the treatments changed attitudes of men towards women's participation in political activities right after the administration of treatment. In the post-treatment survey, we measure willingness of men to let women take a political decision. Male respondents are informed that we plan to hold a political gathering (called *jalsa*) for women at a future date. As part of this activity, we may visit the female respondents and ask them to divide a pot of money (Rs. 500) such that they can donate some or none of the money to help organize

this gathering and keep the balance for themselves. The men are asked if they would let the women make a decision about donating money to the organization of this gathering or would they like to make this decision *for* the women right then. These questions are asked a number of different ways where in two scenarios the location of the event is made salient (either at the venue associated with the party of men's support or at a venue associated with another party), and in one scenario the location is not made salient. All respondents, are asked about all scenarios though the order is randomized.

Columns 2 of Table 1 report the effects of treatments on whether men allow women to make political decisions. In the status-quo, about 38.3 percent of men are willing to let the women make their own decisions. As a result of the alignment treatment, there is an increase of 4.6 percentage points in the likelihood of men allowing women political decision making. The effect is similarly large (4.8 percentage point) for households in the norms treatment. However, the effect is positive but non-significant for households receiving both treatments.

The result of this analysis suggests that the alignment and the norms treatment enabled more men to feel comfortable allowing women to make their own political decisions. Importantly, this result directly measures the behavior of male respondents as these responses were collected during the post treatment survey when the male and female respondents had not had a chance to talk.

3.5 Discussion

Taken together, the patterns point to belief-based constraints, rather than immutable preferences or hard enforcement, as a central barrier to women's participation. Information about alignment appears to loosen a private justification for restricting women's votes: if men expect divergence, they have a reason to withhold permission or to insist on accompaniment, hence, learning that alignment is common reduces the perceived risk of discord resulting in increased participation of women in elections. Further, information about correct community norms plays an important role by lowering the anticipated social cost of letting women vote: when families overestimate opposition in the village, they may fear sanctions or reputational loss; learning that support is widespread re-frames turnout as acceptable and safe. The results imply that women's political participation can respond quickly to low-cost and politically neutral interventions that make local realities common knowledge, with potential for scale wherever intrahousehold mistrust and pluralistic ignorance depress women's agency. Lastly, the design of the experiment plausibly rules out contact or messaging, without information about local realities, as the driver of the results by ensuring that even the control households are contacted with the same frequency as the treatment households.

4 Heterogeneity analysis

We collected detailed data on households and individuals and pre-registered our intention to study if there are heterogeneous effects of the treatment.

4.1 Women empowerment score

In the baseline, male and female respondents were individually asked to identify who in their household is responsible for making decisions related to children's schooling, purchase of clothes, women going to the polling station, women taking a job outside the house, and maintaining social relationships in the village. The respondents could choose either men or women. In the pre-registration, we had declared our intention to test for heterogeneity using a score based on whether women are solely responsible for these decisions or not. We define women empowerment variable in three different ways to conduct the analysis. Table 2 reports the heterogeneity analysis based on the three different ways.

In columns 1, we define a dummy variable empowerment that takes a value of 1 if male respondent in a household assigns higher responsibility to women than female respondents. For this, we add up the number of times each respondent says women are are responsible for the activity. Then we define a variable of women empowerment that takes the value 1 if male member of the household assigned higher responsibility to women compared to the female member. Using this definition, households where women are empowered at baseline have a higher effect on their turnout as a result of the standalone alignment and norms treatments. There is no heterogeneous significant effect on more empowered women in the treatment group that received both treatments. Importantly, the point estimates on the non-interacted treatment indicators are large and significant, indicating that the treatment had a positive effect irrespective of the women's empowerment at baseline.

Columns 2 and 3 report the results of heterogeneity analysis using two other definitions for baseline women empowerment. In columns 2, the empowerment variable is defined to take a value of 1 if the women empowerment score reported by male respondents is higher than the village median, and in columns 3, the score reported by male respondents is standardized. The results do not change substantially, though the point estimates on the interaction between empowerment and both treatment indicator turn significant. These results can be interpreted to suggest that even when women are empowered, men may assert control over their political decision making due to their beliefs. Correcting beliefs leads to a larger effect for such households indicating that this was a binding constraint on women turnout out to vote on the election day.

4.2 Other Baseline Characteristics

We also pre-registered to test heterogeneity on other baseline characteristics. These include characteristics such as whether the household is politically active, the number of unmarried girls in the household, and women's stated misalignment with men. However, analysis of data did not yield any heterogeneous response to the treatments based on these baseline characteristics. Results are available in the appendix.

5 Conclusion

This paper asks whether correcting misperceptions can expand women's electoral participation in a setting where formal rights exist but practice is constrained by social norms and intra-household gatekeeping. We elicit beliefs about (i) the alignment of women's and

men's vote choices and (ii) community norms regarding women's right to vote, and we provide brief, factual, non-partisan information targeted at those misperceptions immediately before the election. The evidence indicates that belief correction can move behavior: accurate information about alignment loosens a private rationale for restricting women's votes, and accurate information about permissive community norms lowers the anticipated social cost of allowing women to vote. The limited incremental value of combining both messages points to a single salient participation hurdle for many households: clearing either the fear of losing out in politics or the fear of disapproval in the community is often enough to unlock participation that is driven by misbeliefs but not by rigid preferences.

The broader implication is that women's political participation is not only a function of material costs, legal rules, or electoral logistics; it is also shaped by what households *believe* about one another and about their neighbors. Belief correction is attractive from a policy perspective precisely because it is neutral, scalable, and respectful of autonomy: it supplies credible information and lets households update. Where pluralistic ignorance and intrahousehold mistrust depress women's agency, such interventions can be deployed alongside institutional reforms-for example, enforcement of voting rights, improvements in polling access and privacy, and party-level commitments to non-interference-to close persistent participation gaps. Because the messages are short and easy to localize, they are well suited to civic campaigns, civil society efforts, and election administration toolkits that seek to expand access without mobilizing for any candidate.

At the same time, the study has limitations. First, we measure outcomes around a single election. We cannot speak to persistence: belief updates may attenuate or compound with repeated exposure, and the equilibrium response of parties, families, and communities could strengthen or offset the initial gains. Second, our primary behavioral measure is turnout, verified by ink-mark inspection; while this mitigates self-report bias, it does not capture downstream political voice (e.g., contacting officials, attending meetings, or standing for office) that would constitute deeper empowerment.

In sum, the findings are consistent with a simple but powerful idea: when households hold pessimistic views about intrahousehold agreement and community acceptance, women's participation is suppressed by expectations rather than by law. Making the local reality common knowledge can relax those belief constraints and expand women's political agency. The approach is modest in tools and scope, yet it offers a pragmatic path for policy and practice to support inclusion while preserving neutrality in contentious electoral environments.

6 Tables and Figures





(a) Misperception of Alignment





(b) Misperception of Norms

Figure 1: **Wedge in beliefs at baseline** Each panel shows the distribution of the wedge in beliefs. Panel 1a represents the difference in beliefs about alignment i.e. the difference between responses to *"Out of 10 women, how many women from your village do you think vote for the same candidate/party as the men?"* and the actual average of 10. Panel 1b represents the difference between responses to the question *"If woman chooses, she has the right to vote" Out of 10 typical men in your village, how many would agree to this statement?* and the actual average support among men in the village community, calculated using men's response to the question *"If woman chooses, she has the right to vote" How much do you agree with this statement?"*.



Figure 2: **Experiment Design**



Figure 3: **Change in men's beliefs** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about female over turnout. Dotted bars represent beliefs measured at baseline and solid bars represent the same beliefs measured in the post-treatment survey. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for each treatment arm before and after the treatment.

Table 1: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness

	Woman Voted = 1	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1
	(1)	(2)
Alignment	0.109	0.046
	(0.028)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.044]
Norms	0.102	0.048
	(0.028)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.034]
Both	0.131	0.033
	(0.029)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.141]
Control mean	0.144	0.383
# Observations	1552	4545
# Households	1552	1515
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.345	0.856
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.017	0.020

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table 2: Heterogeneous Effect on Women's Turnout by Women's Empowerment

	Outcome: Woman Voted = 1		
	M score > W score	Empowered acc to M	Empowerment Score
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.086	0.094	0.109
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.028)
	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.000]
Norms	0.077	0.076	0.102
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.028)
	[0.008]	[0.014]	[0.000]
Both	0.126	0.114	0.132
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	0.116	0.053	0.019
	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.028)
	[0.061]	[0.208]	[0.267]
Empowerment × Norms	0.119	0.090	0.041
	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.026)
	[0.047]	[0.083]	[0.070]
Empowerment × Both	0.014	0.061	0.042
	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.030)
	[0.440]	[0.169]	[0.079]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.337	0.299	0.345
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.306	0.128	0.019
Linear Restrictions: Empowerment × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.363	0.205	0.179
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.030	0.120	0.287

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

Contents

A Links and Deviations from Pre-analysis Plan

We closely follow the registered pre-analysis plan (PAP) - this section provides details this along with minor deviations where applicable.

A.1 Experiment Design

The full experiment design is presented in Figure A1.



Figure A1: **Experiment Design**

A.2 Experiment and sample

We present results from both subsamples outlined in the PAP - households that were strongly pessimistic at baseline (Experiment 1) and households in which at least one member was not strongly pessimistic at baseline (Experiment 2). We registered that we would implement the project in 40 settlements and try to reach 2500-4000 respondents. Due to the short time span of the experiment, we completed the project in 36 villages reaching a total of 2,593 households.

A.3 Outcomes

We present results for all primary and secondary outcomes registered in the PAP.

Primary Outcome: Our primary outcome is female voter turnout. In Table 1 and all heterogeneity analysis, we present results for the main female respondent's turnout. We also examine intra-household spillovers in table in Table A40, where turnout for all female members of the household is considered.

Secondary Outcomes: We have two secondary outcomes, measured in a post treatment survey. *Beliefs about turnout,* We present changes in men's beliefs about turnout in Figure 3. We additionally present changes in men's beliefs about community support for women voting in Figure A4. *Household decision making,* We present results on men's permissiveness regarding women's political decision making in Table 1.

Exploratory Mechanisms: We discussed four exploratory mechanisms in the pre-analysis plan and conducted heterogeneity analysis using all four - politically active families (Table A10), unmarried girls (Table A11), women's stated misalignment with men (Table A12), women empowerment score (Table 2).

Additional Mechanisms: We explored two other mechanisms not were not pre-registered through additional heterogeneity analysis - pessimism of male respondents (Tables A15) and knowledge of preferences of other members of HH (Table A16)

A.4 Analysis

We did not pre-register how we would deal with non-compliance and attrition from the sample. As non-compliance is not high, we report ITT estimates throughout the text so we adhere to the experimental design. In addition, we show that there is no evidence that attrition at endline is caused by treatment so we analyze the observed sample as is.

We present five versions of each model - (i) without controls and with controls for (ii) household, (iii) female, (iv), and (v) all baseline characteristics that are not balanced at baseline. For the main experiment, the household control is monthly income, male control is a binary indicator of whether the respondent voted in 2018, and the female controls are belief about village female voter turnout, own support for women working, belief about support for women working amongst village women, and years of education.

B Data appendix

We have two types of missingness in our sample. First, due to non-compliance - those who received a treatment different from the one assigned to them - and second, due to attrition -those who drop out of the survey at either the post-treatment survey or endline survey step.

Regarding non-compliance - of those were treated, 36 households received the wrong treatment (this constitutes 1.2% of our sample) due to human error in handling the survey software. The treatment was administered over 12 days and all non-compliant households received the treatment on the same day. We account for these non-compliant households by presenting an ITT analysis, by dropping non-compliant households in Appendix A75, and

by instrumenting the treatment received with the treatment assigned during randomization in Appendix A73.

Regarding attrition - these households are ones that we were unable to reach for the treatment or endline survey. 4% of the baseline respondents were not treated and did not answer the post-survey treatment while 2% of the baseline respondents were unreachable during the endline survey. As we present an ITT analysis, households that did not receive treatment but completed the endline survey are included in our main analysis. As before, we drop these households along with non-compliant households in Appendix A75.

The sample evolution for the full sample is outlined in Figure A1 and a detailed breakdown for the experimental sample is in Appendix A1

Table A1: Treatment Assignment vs. Treatment Received

		Treatment Received					Endline Survey	
		Alignment	Norms	Both	Control	None	Completed	Not Completed
Treatment Assigned	Alignment	377	0	1	1	17	390	5
	Norms	3	377	0	2	13	389	7
	Both	1	1	377	2	16	390	7
	Control	1	2	1	369	21	383	11
						1582	**1552**	

C Summary Statistics

Table A2: Summary stats (Household)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
HH size	1582	7.09	2	25	2.75
Monthly income	1502	11366.18	0	25000	8854.01
Own motorcycle	1582	0.61	0	1	0.49
Own vehicle	1581	0.06	0	1	0.25
Organize pol event	1579	0.07	0	1	0.25
Ran for office	1575	0.01	0	1	0.09
Highest yrs of education	1582	5.83	0	20	4.76
N	1582				

Table A3: Summary stats (Male respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	1577	0.96	0	1	0.20
Voted in 2021	1579	0.96	0	1	0.21
Expected female turnout in 2024	1581	6.99	1	10	1.82
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1582	6.90	2	10	1.90
Will vote in 2024	1580	0.91	0	1	0.28
Support women voting	1582	0.90	0	1	0.30
Support women of HH voting	1582	0.90	0	1	0.30
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1582	6.88	1	9	1.99
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1582	6.91	2	10	1.89
Belief about alignment in village	1582	7.44	2	10	1.91
Support women working	1523	0.56	0	1	0.50
Belief about male support for women working in village	1576	6.74	1	10	1.95
Belief about female support for women working in village	1579	6.67	1	10	2.11
Know election validity rules	1423	0.56	0	1	0.50
Know President	1506	0.25	0	1	0.44
Years of education	1582	4.54	0	20	4.57
N	1582				

Table A4: Summary stats (Female respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	1528	0.66	0	1	0.47
Voted in 2021	1551	0.66	0	1	0.47
Expected female turnout in 2024	1573	7.86	1	10	1.84
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1575	7.73	1	10	1.90
Will vote in 2024	1391	0.72	0	1	0.45
Support women voting	1582	0.79	0	1	0.41
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1582	7.14	1	9	1.77
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1578	7.31	1	10	1.93
Will vote same as men	1582	0.89	0	1	0.32
Belief about alignment in village	1582	7.48	1	10	1.97
Support women working	1486	0.46	0	1	0.50
Belief about male support for women working in village	1581	7.18	1	10	1.93
Belief about female support for women working in village	1581	7.19	1	10	1.96
Know election validity rules	1195	0.67	0	1	0.47
Know President	1222	0.10	0	1	0.30
Years of education	1582	1.20	0	16	3.09
N	1582				

D Balance

Table A5: Balance - household

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
HH size	8.321	8.373	8.298	8.275	0.959	0.779	0.902	0.801	1582
Monthly income	17598.727	17535.727	16379.980	16618.900	0.062	0.913	0.032	0.085	1502
Monthly income (cat)	4.372	4.380	4.222	4.227	0.052	0.914	0.050	0.063	1502
Own motorcycle	0.655	0.597	0.663	0.650	0.146	0.066	0.802	0.871	1582
Own vehicle	0.049	0.072	0.065	0.047	0.406	0.197	0.374	0.872	1581
Political org	0.084	0.094	0.101	0.088	0.771	0.560	0.321	0.807	1579
Run for office	0.016	0.013	0.021	0.018	0.683	0.653	0.488	0.723	1575
HH highest education	6.091	6.673	6.401	6.302	0.317	0.065	0.329	0.498	1582

Notes: This table reports balance in household baseline characteristics across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the household characteristic on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages of the household characteristic for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported.

Table A6: Balance - men

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.972	0.998	0.972	0.959	0.010	0.029	1.000	0.364	1577
Voted in 2021	0.954	0.946	0.944	0.956	0.807	0.593	0.484	0.892	1579
Belief: Village female turnout	6.992	6.907	6.900	7.034	0.356	0.363	0.320	0.628	1581
Will vote 2024	0.999	1.002	0.985	1.014	0.405	0.850	0.409	0.364	1580
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.999	0.994	0.990	1.016	0.269	0.719	0.538	0.206	1582
Belief: Support women of HH voting (own)	0.998	0.998	0.989	1.015	0.356	0.997	0.535	0.249	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	6.948	7.008	6.927	7.017	0.708	0.521	0.822	0.447	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	7.004	6.884	6.894	7.018	0.323	0.209	0.247	0.877	1582
Belief: Alignment (village)	8.596	8.550	8.530	8.624	0.709	0.611	0.465	0.753	1582
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.970	0.964	0.961	0.975	0.966	0.831	0.755	0.866	1523
Belief: Support women working (village men)	6.967	6.906	6.997	7.031	0.631	0.537	0.763	0.521	1576
Belief: Support women working (village women)	6.887	6.873	6.902	6.971	0.801	0.901	0.886	0.425	1579
Know election validity	0.067	0.095	0.057	0.041	0.263	0.313	0.724	0.372	1423
Know President	0.355	0.357	0.353	0.347	0.987	0.945	0.954	0.779	1506
Years of education	4.638	5.086	4.697	4.712	0.448	0.139	0.847	0.805	1582

Notes: This table reports balance in men's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of men's response on the treatment group indicator. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported.

Table A7: Balance - women

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.879	0.870	0.854	0.871	0.875	0.772	0.419	0.791	1528
Voted in 2021	0.871	0.832	0.833	0.843	0.520	0.186	0.203	0.362	1551
Belief: Village female turnout	8.839	8.783	9.002	8.843	0.019	0.487	0.038	0.961	1573
Will vote 2024	0.850	0.846	0.838	0.841	0.951	0.868	0.588	0.703	1391
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.973	0.944	1.007	1.042	0.000	0.201	0.125	0.001	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	8.182	8.208	8.220	8.190	0.964	0.743	0.638	0.923	1582
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	8.577	8.564	8.641	8.585	0.835	0.893	0.476	0.928	1578
Belief: Alignment (own)	0.937	0.937	0.945	0.949	0.825	0.969	0.637	0.465	1582
Belief: Alignment (village)	8.938	8.828	8.966	8.969	0.304	0.207	0.755	0.727	1582
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.804	0.809	0.830	0.847	0.530	0.879	0.418	0.191	1486
Belief: Support women working (village men)	8.391	8.420	8.409	8.413	0.992	0.759	0.849	0.813	1581
Belief: Support women working (village women)	8.482	8.367	8.480	8.604	0.084	0.242	0.987	0.193	1581
Know election validity	0.731	0.751	0.744	0.709	0.438	0.493	0.681	0.454	1195
Know President	-0.004	0.014	0.000	0.036	0.278	0.408	0.848	0.074	1222
Years of education	1.500	1.632	1.814	2.220	0.009	0.488	0.119	0.001	1582

Notes: This table reports balance in women's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of women's response on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported.

Table A8: Balance - missing responses

Variable	A: Control	B: Norms	C: Alignment	D: Both	Joint orth	A-B=0	A-C=0	A-D=0	N
Treated ==1	0.947	0.968	0.958	0.960	0.557	0.152	0.464	0.392	1582
						[0.163]	[0.405]	[0.305]	
Rapid survey ==1	0.985	0.998	0.992	0.992	0.597	0.170	0.471	0.485	1582
						[0.248]	[0.520]	[0.586]	

Notes: This table reports balance in dropouts across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the dropout indicator on the treatment group indicators. The first row is an indicator of whether respondents who completed the baseline survey received the treatment; the second row is an indicator of whether baseline respondents also completed the post-treatment survey. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A-D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. P-values from the joint orthogonality test are reported. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets for the pairwise tests.

E Appendix Figures



Figure A2: **Gender Gap in Turnout Around the World** Each bar in this figure represents the percentage point difference between the female and male voter turnout using data from Wave 7 (2017-2023) of the World Values Survey. Participants were asked "Do you vote in national elections" - those who responded "Always" were counted as voters, while those who responded "Usually", "Never", "No answer", or "Don't know" were considered non-voters.



Figure A3: **Reasons for not voting at baseline** This figure represents the proportion of female respondents who reported the respective reasons for not voting in each election.

F Main Secondary Outcomes

F.1 Beliefs about norms



Figure A4: **Change in men's beliefs** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about community support for women voting. Dotted bars represent beliefs measured at baseline and solid bars represent the same beliefs measured in the post-treatment survey. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for each treatment arm before and after the treatment.

F.2 Household decision making

Table A9: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
	No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.039	0.049	0.046
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.104]	[0.035]	[0.044]
Norms	0.045	0.049	0.048
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.051]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Both	0.032	0.034	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
	[0.177]	[0.145]	[0.141]
Control mean	0.378	0.386	0.383
# Observations	1515	3030	4545
# Households	1515	1515	1515
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.823	0.800	0.856
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.043	0.017	0.020

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 1 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 2 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 3 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G Pre-registered Heterogeneity

G.1 Politically Active Families

In the baseline, we ask male respondents if (i) their family has a run a political campaign for a candidate in the past, and (ii) anyone from their family has contested elections. We label the family as politically active if the answer to any to of the questions is yes.
1 if never organised political campaign or ran for office, 0 if engaged in at least one activity.

Table A10: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.049
	(0.110)
	[0.350]
Norms	0.119
	(0.113)
	[0.158]
Both	0.068
	(0.112)
	[0.282]
No political involvement × Alignment	0.065
	(0.114)
	[0.298]
No political involvement × Norms	-0.019
	(0.117)
	[0.451]
No political involvement × Both	0.068
	(0.116)
	[0.290]
Control mean	0.144
# Observations	1551
# Households	1551
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.156
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.215
Linear Restrictions: No political involvement × Treatment (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.127
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.452

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G.2 Unmarried Girls

We collect information about the number and proportion of unmarried girls in the family. We define 'No unmarried' as 1 if there are 0 unmarried girls in the household, 0 otherwise; 'More unmarried' as 1 if there are more unmarried girls in the household than the sample-village median, 0 otherwise; and 'Greater prop unmarried' as 1 if the proportion of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median, 0 otherwise.

Table A11: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.140	0.102	0.102
	(0.065)	(0.032)	(0.031)
	[0.020]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Norms	0.063	0.116	0.114
	(0.063)	(0.031)	(0.031)
	[0.169]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Both	0.081	0.143	0.148
	(0.063)	(0.032)	(0.032)
	[0.097]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.040	0.038	0.037
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.074)
	[0.310]	[0.320]	[0.329]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.049	-0.069	-0.063
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.073)
	[0.257]	[0.182]	[0.210]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.064	-0.056	-0.079
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
	[0.185]	[0.223]	[0.136]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.303	0.510	0.511
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.056	0.049	0.088
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.259	0.250	0.254
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.300	0.406	0.310

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

G.3 Women's stated misalignment with men

We collect women's responses about whether they will not consider voting for the same candidate as men. We define 'Some or all men' as 1 if women report that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household at baseline and 0 otherwise.'All men' is a more restrictive version of this.

Table A12: Ink mark voting by voting alignment

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men (1)	All men (2)
Alignment	0.086	0.028
	(0.090)	(0.059)
	[0.171]	[0.318]
Norms	0.052	0.007
	(0.079)	(0.056)
	[0.262]	[0.468]
Both	0.210	0.123
	(0.090)	(0.061)
	[0.011]	[0.028]
Voting alignment × Alignment	0.026	0.107
	(0.095)	(0.067)
	[0.412]	[0.058]
Voting alignment × Norms	0.056	0.126
	(0.084)	(0.065)
	[0.259]	[0.029]
Voting alignment × Both	-0.087	0.013
	(0.095)	(0.069)
	[0.189]	[0.441]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.220	0.191
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.421	0.335
Linear Restrictions: Voting alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.211	0.318
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.184	0.024

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Column 2 uses a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

H Non-preregistered Results

H.1 Spillover effects on other members of household

Table A13: Intra-HH spillover effects

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.111	0.123	0.104
	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.028)
	[0.000]	[0.025]	[0.001]
Norms	0.079	0.040	0.099
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.028)
	[0.011]	[0.425]	[0.013]
Both	0.112	0.080	0.126
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.029)
	[0.001]	[0.104]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2339	783	1552
# Households	1552	586	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.429	0.264	0.473
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.058	0.233	0.061

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

H.2 Effects on reported constraints to voting

Table A14: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.073	-0.055	0.030	-0.008	-0.016	-0.014	0.002
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.006)
	[0.009]	[0.004]	[0.018]	[0.174]	[0.176]	[0.065]	[0.501]
Norms	-0.057	-0.055	0.023	-0.005	-0.005	-0.021	0.000
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[0.037]	[0.004]	[0.047]	[0.244]	[0.384]	[0.011]	[0.487]
Both	-0.104	-0.079	0.014	-0.004	0.009	-0.024	-0.000
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.156]	[0.337]	[0.339]	[0.004]	[0.480]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.268	0.518	0.266	0.257	0.301	0.377	0.345
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.370	0.193	0.014	0.111	0.119	0.148	0.427

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

I Mechanisms

I.1 Pessimism of male respondents

Table A15: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.076	0.096	0.082
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.031)
	[0.015]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Norms	0.083	0.054	0.079
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.031)
	[0.006]	[0.072]	[0.006]
Both	0.120	0.132	0.110
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.032)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.131	0.035	0.165
	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.076)
	[0.020]	[0.288]	[0.014]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.074	0.136	0.136
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.071)
	[0.127]	[0.013]	[0.035]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.047	-0.002	0.128
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.072)
	[0.244]	[0.501]	[0.048]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.499	0.289	0.366
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.256	0.464	0.131
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.307	0.287	0.334
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.027	0.099	0.013

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

I.2 Knowledge of preferences of other members of HH

Table A16: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.021	-0.060
	(0.071)	(0.085)
	[0.405]	[0.251]
Norms	0.058	-0.060
	(0.067)	(0.083)
	[0.199]	[0.236]
Both	0.107	-0.003
	(0.077)	(0.086)
	[0.079]	[0.504]
Know preference × Alignment	0.109	0.194
	(0.077)	(0.090)
	[0.083]	[0.015]
Know preference × Norms	0.056	0.186
	(0.074)	(0.088)
	[0.226]	[0.017]
Know preference × Both	0.032	0.153
	(0.083)	(0.092)
	[0.363]	[0.050]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1552	1552
# Households	1552	1552
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.160	0.510
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.407	0.136
Linear Restrictions: Know preference × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.168	0.347
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.074	0.009

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also them asked them 'We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men guess about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same. "

J Optimistic Sample Results

J.1 Summary statistics

Table A17: Summary stats (Household)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
HH size	1011	6.92	2	26	2.85
Monthly income	934	11997.86	0	25000	9204.01
Own motorcycle	1008	0.69	0	1	0.46
Own vehicle	1010	0.10	0	1	0.30
Organize pol event	1005	0.06	0	1	0.25
Ran for office	1005	0.03	0	1	0.17
Highest yrs of education	1011	7.93	0	20	4.39
N	1011				

Table A18: Summary stats (Male respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	1005	0.93	0	1	0.25
Voted in 2021	1005	0.92	0	1	0.27
Expected female turnout in 2024	1003	7.33	1	10	1.90
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1006	7.17	1	10	2.02
Will vote in 2024	1004	0.89	0	1	0.31
Support women voting	1011	0.85	0	1	0.36
Support women of HH voting	1011	0.85	0	1	0.36
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1005	7.40	1	10	1.98
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1005	7.21	1	10	1.99
Belief about alignment in village	1005	7.43	1	10	1.98
Support women working	922	0.66	0	1	0.48
Belief about male support for women working in village	991	7.01	1	10	2.10
Belief about female support for women working in village	995	6.86	1	10	2.31
Know election validity rules	854	0.46	0	1	0.50
Know President	951	0.34	0	1	0.47
Years of education	1011	6.64	0	16	4.43
N	1011				

Table A19: Summary stats (Female respondents)

	N	Mean	Min	Max	SD
Voted in 2018	972	0.62	0	1	0.49
Voted in 2021	999	0.66	0	1	0.47
Expected female turnout in 2024	999	8.06	1	10	2.05
Estimated female turnout in 2018	1001	8.12	1	10	2.25
Will vote in 2024	927	0.75	0	1	0.43
Support women voting	1011	0.83	0	1	0.38
Belief about male support for women voting in village	1002	8.03	1	10	2.20
Belief about female support for women voting in village	1002	7.97	1	10	2.21
Will vote same as men	1011	0.83	0	1	0.37
Belief about alignment in village	1002	7.61	1	10	2.20
Support women working	943	0.64	0	1	0.48
Belief about male support for women working in village	1003	7.63	1	10	2.20
Belief about female support for women working in village	1004	7.84	1	10	2.27
Know election validity rules	577	0.71	0	1	0.46
Know President	564	0.03	0	1	0.17
Years of education	1011	1.54	0	20	3.50
N	1011				

J.2 Balance tables

Table A20: Balance - household

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
HH size	7.855	8.293	0.011	1011
Monthly income	21499.900	21833.432	0.416	934
Monthly income (cat)	4.741	4.815	0.198	934
Own motorcycle	0.793	0.829	0.173	1008
Own vehicle	0.012	0.025	0.472	1010
Political org	0.028	0.047	0.185	1005
Run for office	0.003	-0.003	0.520	1005
HH highest education	7.792	7.801	0.973	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in household characteristics across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the household characteristic on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and B contain the estimated averages of the household characteristic for each treatment group.

Table A21: Balance - men

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.999	1.001	0.918	1005
Voted in 2021	0.979	0.983	0.826	1005
Belief: Village female turnout	8.833	8.612	0.011	1003
Will vote 2024	0.954	0.972	0.352	1004
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.994	1.006	0.573	1011
Belief: Support women of HH voting (own)	0.998	1.002	0.856	1011
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	8.946	8.758	0.041	1005
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	8.714	8.582	0.154	1005
Belief: Alignment (village)	8.898	8.732	0.061	1005
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.909	0.909	0.990	922
Belief: Support women working (village men)	8.896	8.733	0.089	991
Belief: Support women working (village women)	8.775	8.670	0.315	995
Know election validity	0.033	0.056	0.250	854
Know President	0.674	0.660	0.552	951
Years of education	6.836	6.868	0.905	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in men's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of men's response on the treatment group indicator. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and B contain the estimated averages for each treatment group.

Table A22: Balance - women

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
Voted in 2018	0.939	0.978	0.139	972
Voted in 2021	0.912	0.940	0.288	999
Belief: Village female turnout	9.246	9.273	0.747	999
Will vote 2024	0.976	0.983	0.782	927
Belief: Support women voting (own)	0.985	1.015	0.131	1011
Belief: Support women voting (village men)	9.781	9.885	0.253	1002
Belief: Support women voting (village women)	9.072	9.113	0.674	1002
Belief: Alignment (own)	0.992	1.008	0.406	1011
Belief: Alignment (village)	9.193	9.288	0.338	1002
Belief: Support women working (own)	0.886	0.877	0.716	943
Belief: Support women working (village men)	9.251	9.305	0.575	1003
Belief: Support women working (village women)	9.004	9.070	0.513	1004
Know election validity	0.618	0.662	0.175	577
Know President	0.032	0.012	0.109	564
Years of education	1.188	1.108	0.710	1011

Notes: This table reports balance in women's baseline responses across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of women's response on the treatment group indicators. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and B contain the estimated averages for each treatment group.

Table A23: Balance - missing responses (exp2)

Variable	A: Control	B: Alignment	A-B=0	N
Treated ==1	1.000	1.000	0.977	1011
			[0.858]	
Rapid survey ==1	0.993	1.007	0.111	1011
			[0.074]	

Notes: This table reports balance in dropouts across treatment groups. Each row represents the regression of the dropout indicator on the treatment group indicators. The first row is an indicator of whether respondents who completed the baseline survey received the treatment; the second row is an indicator of whether baseline respondents also completed the post-treatment survey. All models include block fixed effects. Columns A and D contain the estimated averages for each treatment group. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A24: Effects on turnout of female voters in 2024 and men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings

	Woman Voted = 1	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
		No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alignment	0.094	-0.036	-0.025	-0.029
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)
	[0.000]	[0.127]	[0.275]	[0.204]
Control mean	0.154	0.384	0.383	0.383
# Observations	985	980	1962	2943
# Households	985	980	981	981

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes for the second experiment - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Columns 2 to 4, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 3 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 4 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.3 Primary outcome: intra-household spillovers

Table A25: Intra-HH spillover effects

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.097	0.108	0.092
	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.025)
	[0.001]	[0.008]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.145	0.128	0.154
# Observations	1553	565	985
# Households	985	395	985

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.4 Secondary outcome: beliefs about turnout



Figure A5: **Change in men's beliefs (exp 2)** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about female voter turnout. Dotted bars represent beliefs measured at baseline and solid bars represent the same beliefs measured in the post-treatment survey. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for each treatment arm before and after the treatment.

J.5 Additional outcome: beliefs about norms



Figure A6: **Change in men's beliefs (exp 2)** This figure presents the distribution of men's beliefs about community support for women voting. Dotted bars represent beliefs measured at baseline and solid bars represent the same beliefs measured in the post-treatment survey. The p-values are exact p-values from Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of equality of distribution of the two - we compare the distribution of beliefs for each treatment arm before and after the treatment.

J.6 Additional outcome: constraints to voting



Figure A7: **Reasons for not voting at baseline** This figure represents the proportion of female respondents who reported the respective reasons for not voting in each election.

Table A26: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.075	-0.032	0.002	-0.007	0.019	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	[0.003]	[0.026]	[0.448]	[0.076]	[0.036]	[0.240]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985	985	985	985	985	985
# Households	985	985	985	985	985	985	985

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.7 Heterogeneity analysis: women empowerment score

Table A27: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score	Empowered acc to M	Empowerment Score
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.096	0.112	0.094
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.025)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	-0.005	-0.078	-0.008
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.026)
	[0.480]	[0.089]	[0.386]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985	985
# Households	985	985	985

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.8 Heterogeneity analysis - politically active families

Table A28: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.013
	(0.085)
	[0.460]
No political involvement × Alignment	0.087
	(0.089)
	[0.181]
Control mean	0.154
# Observations	981
# Households	981

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.9 Heterogeneity analysis - unmarried girls

Table A29: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.036	0.105	0.105
	(0.069)	(0.027)	(0.027)
	[0.308]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	0.068	-0.078	-0.081
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
	[0.185]	[0.158]	[0.145]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985	985
# Households	985	985	985

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.10 Heterogeneity analysis - pessimism of male respondents

Table A30: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.091	0.116	0.114
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.016	-0.079	-0.109
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.065)
	[0.408]	[0.090]	[0.052]
Control mean	0.154	0.154	0.154
# Observations	979	979	978
# Households	979	979	978

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

J.11 Heterogeneity analysis - knowledge of preferences of other members of HH

Table A31: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.104	0.139
	(0.069)	(0.066)
	[0.069]	[0.019]
Know preference × Alignment	-0.010	-0.052
	(0.075)	(0.072)
	[0.468]	[0.250]
Control mean	0.154	0.154
# Observations	985	985
# Households	985	985

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also them asked them 'We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men guess about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same. "

K Robustness Checks

K.1 Robustness to additional controls

K.1.1 Primary outcome: Female voter turnout

Table A32: Effect on women's turnout

	Woman Voted = 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alignment	0.098	0.118	0.115	0.102
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Norms	0.094	0.104	0.102	0.092
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Both	0.128	0.131	0.133	0.131
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Controls	HH	Male	Female	All
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1491	1450	1372
# Households	1475	1491	1450	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)				
Alignment = Norms	0.345	0.353	0.342	0.342
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.074	0.006	0.013	0.093

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on female voter turnout. The outcome is whether the main female respondent of the household voted (1) or not (0), verified using the indelible ink mark. The columns correspond to different sets of controls. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.2 Secondary outcome: household decision making

Table A33: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings (HH controls)

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
	No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.051	0.062	0.058
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)
	[0.039]	[0.011]	[0.014]
Norms	0.048	0.053	0.051
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.049]	[0.029]	[0.030]
Both	0.040	0.043	0.042
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.101]	[0.083]	[0.080]
Control mean	0.378	0.386	0.383
# Observations	1438	2876	4314
# Households	1438	1438	1438
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.654	0.619	0.634
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.023	0.008	0.009

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 1 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 2 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 3 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A34: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings (female controls)

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
	No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.044	0.055	0.051
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.072]	[0.019]	[0.025]
Norms	0.050	0.054	0.053
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.038]	[0.018]	[0.020]
Both	0.050	0.053	0.052
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.037]	[0.025]	[0.023]
Control mean	0.378	0.386	0.383
# Observations	1422	2844	4266
# Households	1422	1422	1422
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.952	0.665	0.995
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.072	0.017	0.023

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 1 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 2 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 3 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A35: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings (male controls)

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
	No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.038	0.049	0.045
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)
	[0.118]	[0.037]	[0.051]
Norms	0.047	0.052	0.050
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
	[0.046]	[0.025]	[0.028]
Both	0.034	0.041	0.039
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
	[0.157]	[0.091]	[0.100]
Control mean	0.378	0.386	0.383
# Observations	1450	2900	4350
# Households	1450	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.803	0.912	0.892
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.048	0.018	0.023

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 1 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 2 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 3 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A36: Effects on men's permissiveness regarding women's political gatherings (ALL controls)

	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1		
	No loc	Loc	All rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.056	0.067	0.063
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.030]	[0.007]	[0.008]
Norms	0.055	0.059	0.057
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
	[0.030]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Both	0.057	0.061	0.059
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
	[0.023]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Control mean	0.378	0.386	0.383
# Observations	1344	2688	4032
# Households	1344	1344	1344
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.662	0.639	0.650
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.035	0.008	0.011

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 1 reports results for the question in which no location for the political gathering was mentioned. Column 2 presents results for responses to questions in which location of political gathering was specified as the house of a political ally or opponent; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and location fixed effects, and cluster standard at the respondent level. Column 3 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.3 Additional outcome: Spillover effects on other members of household

Table A37: Intra-HH spillover effects (HH controls)

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.102	0.121	0.093
	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.029)
	[0.002]	[0.033]	[0.004]
Norms	0.077	0.049	0.091
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)
	[0.016]	[0.344]	[0.020]
Both	0.112	0.091	0.123
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)
	[0.001]	[0.074]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2226	747	1475
# Households	1475	558	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.505	0.277	0.547
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.141	0.237	0.148

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A38: Intra-HH spillover effects (male controls

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.119	0.125	0.113
	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.025]	[0.000]
Norms	0.079	0.036	0.101
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.029)
	[0.012]	[0.472]	[0.014]
Both	0.117	0.095	0.126
	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.029)
	[0.001]	[0.065]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2256	761	1491
# Households	1491	569	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.365	0.254	0.390
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.069	0.410	0.071

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A39: Intra-HH spillover effects (female controls)

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.115	0.103	0.110
	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.038]	[0.000]
Norms	0.102	0.015	0.099
	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.526]	[0.000]
Both	0.133	0.058	0.127
	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.172]	[0.000]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	1450	635	1450
# Households	1450	510	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.661	0.274	0.663
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.028	0.239	0.028

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A40: Intra-HH spillover effects

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.103	0.113	0.097
	(0.033)	(0.057)	(0.030)
	[0.002]	[0.042]	[0.001]
Norms	0.077	0.040	0.089
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.030)
	[0.016]	[0.431]	[0.004]
Both	0.114	0.083	0.126
	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.031)
	[0.001]	[0.088]	[0.000]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2218	746	1372
# Households	1468	557	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.492	0.267	0.662
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.144	0.297	0.188

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.4 Additional outcome: Effects on reported constraints to voting

Table A41: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (HH controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.066	-0.062	0.034	-0.002	-0.013	-0.014	0.002
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.006)
	[0.021]	[0.002]	[0.011]	[0.489]	[0.230]	[0.082]	[0.512]
Norms	-0.048	-0.058	0.024	-0.000	0.001	-0.022	0.000
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.006)
	[0.069]	[0.005]	[0.046]	[0.461]	[0.488]	[0.012]	[0.500]
Both	-0.105	-0.083	0.016	0.001	0.014	-0.025	-0.000
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.128]	[0.391]	[0.206]	[0.007]	[0.367]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.243	0.341	0.238	0.360	0.288	0.365	0.351
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.481	0.131	0.011	0.326	0.170	0.160	0.398

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A42: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (Male controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.082	-0.059	0.031	-0.009	-0.018	-0.014	0.002
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.006)
	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.015]	[0.098]	[0.159]	[0.079]	[0.483]
Norms	-0.058	-0.054	0.025	-0.007	-0.007	-0.022	-0.000
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.035]	[0.006]	[0.039]	[0.188]	[0.347]	[0.012]	[0.517]
Both	-0.099	-0.075	0.015	-0.005	0.004	-0.025	0.000
	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.006)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.130]	[0.348]	[0.443]	[0.007]	[0.460]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491
# Households	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.238	0.355	0.330	0.292	0.250	0.347	0.289
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.222	0.104	0.011	0.070	0.114	0.190	0.454

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A43: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (Female controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.081	-0.065	0.027	-0.009	-0.022	-0.012	0.005
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.005)
	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.026]	[0.090]	[0.102]	[0.129]	[0.309]
Norms	-0.056	-0.064	0.022	-0.006	-0.007	-0.020	0.003
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.045]	[0.002]	[0.054]	[0.206]	[0.339]	[0.014]	[0.158]
Both	-0.113	-0.078	0.012	-0.005	0.007	-0.021	0.002
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.004)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.187]	[0.267]	[0.369]	[0.020]	[0.511]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.211	0.345	0.290	0.228	0.290	0.333	0.268
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.409	0.021	0.018	0.087	0.088	0.172	0.151

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A44: Reported reasons for not voting in 2024 (All controls)

	Outcome: Reasons for not voting						
	Stay home	No comp-anion	Men at PS	No one asked	Busy/ sick	Voting is useless	No reason
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Alignment	-0.071	-0.068	0.028	-0.003	-0.019	-0.012	0.005
	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.006)
	[0.015]	[0.002]	[0.025]	[0.380]	[0.145]	[0.136]	[0.315]
Norms	-0.045	-0.066	0.022	-0.001	0.000	-0.022	0.004
	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.005)
	[0.098]	[0.003]	[0.061]	[0.423]	[0.517]	[0.014]	[0.171]
Both	-0.114	-0.079	0.012	0.001	0.011	-0.022	0.002
	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.004)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.193]	[0.459]	[0.276]	[0.022]	[0.509]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)							
Alignment = Norms	0.186	0.345	0.279	0.342	0.278	0.330	0.320
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.511	0.014	0.019	0.280	0.137	0.152	0.159

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on women's reported constraints to voting in the 2024 general election. Each outcome is a binary indicator of whether the specified constraint was reported as a reason for not voting in the post-treatment survey by the main respondent of the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.5 Heterogeneity analysis: Women empowerment score

Table A45: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment (HH controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score (1)	Empowered acc to M (2)	Empowerment Score (3)
Alignment	0.082	0.081	0.098
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.029)
	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.001]
Norms	0.082	0.064	0.092
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.029)
	[0.006]	[0.039]	[0.001]
Both	0.127	0.103	0.128
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	0.096	0.061	0.019
	(0.079)	(0.064)	(0.029)
	[0.116]	[0.176]	[0.283]
Empowerment × Norms	0.064	0.103	0.032
	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.030)
	[0.206]	[0.060]	[0.153]
Empowerment × Both	-0.008	0.088	0.042
	(0.078)	(0.064)	(0.030)
	[0.476]	[0.088]	[0.080]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.518	0.275	0.344
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.312	0.225	0.088
Linear Restrictions: Empowerment × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.229	0.342	0.365
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.075	0.136	0.421

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A46: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment (female controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score (1)	Empowered acc to M (2)	Empowerment Score (3)
Alignment	0.091	0.096	0.116
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.000]
Norms	0.085	0.082	0.104
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.029)
	[0.004]	[0.011]	[0.000]
Both	0.128	0.117	0.135
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	0.128	0.076	0.019
	(0.081)	(0.068)	(0.031)
	[0.057]	[0.140]	[0.267]
Empowerment × Norms	0.085	0.081	0.024
	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.028)
	[0.131]	[0.122]	[0.210]
Empowerment × Both	0.007	0.062	0.030
	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.032)
	[0.479]	[0.182]	[0.171]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1450	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.341	0.322	0.343
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.214	0.110	0.014
Linear Restrictions: Empowerment × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.237	0.488	0.453
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.044	0.094	0.334

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A47: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment (male controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score (1)	Empowered acc to M (2)	Empowerment Score (3)
Alignment	0.097	0.106	0.118
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.029)
	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Norms	0.080	0.081	0.104
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.029)
	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.000]
Both	0.124	0.113	0.131
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	0.106	0.044	0.018
	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.029)
	[0.084]	[0.261]	[0.289]
Empowerment × Norms	0.114	0.079	0.038
	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.027)
	[0.057]	[0.117]	[0.095]
Empowerment × Both	0.022	0.064	0.037
	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.031)
	[0.400]	[0.169]	[0.120]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1491	1491	1491
# Households	1491	1491	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.317	0.272	0.344
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.174	0.042	0.006
Linear Restrictions: Empowerment × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.346	0.194	0.227
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.040	0.199	0.292

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A48: Ink mark voting by women's empowerment (ALL controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M score > W score (1)	Empowered acc to M (2)	Empowerment Score (3)
Alignment	0.086	0.082	0.103
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.031)
	[0.004]	[0.011]	[0.000]
Norms	0.090	0.068	0.092
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.030)
	[0.004]	[0.032]	[0.002]
Both	0.131	0.108	0.134
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.031)
	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.000]
Empowerment × Alignment	0.109	0.080	0.016
	(0.088)	(0.070)	(0.033)
	[0.113]	[0.134]	[0.313]
Empowerment × Norms	0.012	0.094	0.008
	(0.083)	(0.070)	(0.032)
	[0.452]	[0.093]	[0.423]
Empowerment × Both	-0.014	0.093	0.029
	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.033)
	[0.450]	[0.095]	[0.185]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1372	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.515	0.299	0.341
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.253	0.233	0.108
Linear Restrictions: Empowerment × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.119	0.463	0.225
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.125	0.131	0.463

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's empowerment score, which is calculated based on men's and women's responses to five questions related to the manner in which they share domestic decision-making. In Column 1, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if the men's score is lower than the women's score and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the heterogeneity variable takes value 1 if women's empowerment score - based on men's responses - is greater than the sample-village median. In Column 3, men's score is standardised by one standard deviation from the sample mean. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.6 Heterogeneity analysis: Politically Active Families

Table A49: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household (HH controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.056
	(0.112)
	[0.329]
Norms	0.118
	(0.114)
	[0.161]
Both	0.067
	(0.113)
	[0.286]
Political Activity × Alignment	0.045
	(0.116)
	[0.361]
Political Activity × Norms	-0.027
	(0.118)
	[0.424]
Political Activity × Both	0.065
	(0.117)
	[0.297]
Control mean	0.144
# Observations	1474
# Households	1474
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.167
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.199
Linear Restrictions: Political Activity × Treatment (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.138
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.384

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A50: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household (female controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.064
	(0.142)
	[0.341]
Norms	0.226
	(0.153)
	[0.087]
Both	0.015
	(0.133)
	[0.475]
Political Activity × Alignment	0.052
	(0.145)
	[0.373]
Political Activity × Norms	-0.132
	(0.156)
	[0.221]
Political Activity × Both	0.124
	(0.137)
	[0.191]
Control mean	0.144
# Observations	1449
# Households	1449
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.129
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.130
Linear Restrictions: Political Activity × Treatment (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.098
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.261

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A51: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household (Male controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.083
	(0.112)
	[0.241]
Norms	0.117
	(0.114)
	[0.165]
Both	0.057
	(0.114)
	[0.320]
Political Activity × Alignment	0.037
	(0.116)
	[0.387]
Political Activity × Norms	-0.015
	(0.118)
	[0.465]
Political Activity × Both	0.080
	(0.118)
	[0.259]
Control mean	0.144
# Observations	1491
# Households	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.240
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.135
Linear Restrictions: Political Activity × Treatment (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.167
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.360

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A52: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by political involvement of household (ALL controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	(1)
Alignment	0.061
	(0.143)
	[0.351]
Norms	0.222
	(0.153)
	[0.091]
Both	0.016
	(0.133)
	[0.470]
Political Activity × Alignment	0.042
	(0.147)
	[0.402]
Political Activity × Norms	-0.138
	(0.157)
	[0.210]
Political Activity × Both	0.121
	(0.137)
	[0.202]
Control mean	0.144
# Observations	1372
# Households	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.142
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.137
Linear Restrictions: Political Activity × Treatment (exact p-values)	
Alignment = Norms	0.103
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.250

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by political involvement of households. 'No political involvement' is a binary indicator of whether anyone in the household ran for office in 2018 or 2021 and/or helped organize political activities during those elections. Block fixed effects are included. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.7 Heterogeneity analysis: Unmarried Girls

Table A53: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household (HH controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.119	0.094	0.094
	(0.066)	(0.033)	(0.032)
	[0.040]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Norms	0.061	0.107	0.105
	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.032)
	[0.187]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Both	0.086	0.137	0.142
	(0.065)	(0.033)	(0.033)
	[0.090]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.026	0.023	0.023
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.076)
	[0.387]	[0.396]	[0.406]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.042	-0.063	-0.057
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.075)
	[0.291]	[0.213]	[0.243]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.053	-0.045	-0.069
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.074)
	[0.242]	[0.280]	[0.181]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.313	0.510	0.512
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.101	0.098	0.156
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.281	0.271	0.277
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.351	0.494	0.371

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A54: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household (Female controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.144	0.108	0.109
	(0.066)	(0.033)	(0.033)
	[0.020]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Norms	0.076	0.113	0.112
	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.033)
	[0.130]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Both	0.094	0.142	0.147
	(0.064)	(0.034)	(0.033)
	[0.071]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.037	0.035	0.034
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.077)
	[0.327]	[0.335]	[0.352]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.034	-0.054	-0.048
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.076)
	[0.329]	[0.245]	[0.278]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.051	-0.043	-0.067
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.074)
	[0.245]	[0.290]	[0.189]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1450	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.160	0.518	0.518
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.048	0.039	0.067
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.106	0.093	0.113
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.291	0.406	0.307

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A55: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household (male controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.155	0.109	0.109
	(0.065)	(0.033)	(0.032)
	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Norms	0.077	0.115	0.113
	(0.063)	(0.032)	(0.032)
	[0.120]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Both	0.094	0.139	0.144
	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.033)
	[0.067]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.046	0.045	0.045
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.075)
	[0.287]	[0.285]	[0.295]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.034	-0.053	-0.047
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.074)
	[0.329]	[0.245]	[0.276]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.047	-0.039	-0.062
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)
	[0.264]	[0.304]	[0.202]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1491	1491	1491
# Households	1491	1491	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.312	0.505	0.510
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.037	0.019	0.041
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.261	0.251	0.264
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.273	0.379	0.284

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A56: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household (ALL controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	No unmarried girls (1)	More unmarried (2)	Greater prop unmarried (3)
Alignment	0.119	0.099	0.100
	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.034)
	[0.045]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Norms	0.074	0.102	0.101
	(0.066)	(0.034)	(0.034)
	[0.146]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Both	0.101	0.138	0.143
	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.035)
	[0.066]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Unmarried Women × Alignment	-0.021	0.016	0.015
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.079)
	[0.412]	[0.428]	[0.436]
Unmarried Women × Norms	0.024	-0.046	-0.039
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.079)
	[0.385]	[0.287]	[0.329]
Unmarried Women × Both	0.039	-0.030	-0.056
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)
	[0.309]	[0.352]	[0.240]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1372	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.190	0.518	0.518
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.105	0.112	0.168
Linear Restrictions: Unmarried Women × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.266	0.176	0.295
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.359	0.514	0.377

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity in treatment effects by the presence, number, and proportion of unmarried girls in the household. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by whether there are any unmarried girls in the household; Column 2 by whether the number of unmarried girls in the household is greater than the sample-village median; Column 3 is similar to Column 2 but uses the number of unmarried girls as a proportion of all women in the household. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.8 Heterogeneity analysis: Women's stated misalignment with men

Table A57: Ink mark voting by voting alignment (HH controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men (1)	All men (2)
Alignment	0.087	0.028
	(0.090)	(0.059)
	[0.170]	[0.319]
Norms	0.058	0.011
	(0.080)	(0.056)
	[0.242]	[0.449]
Both	0.212	0.125
	(0.090)	(0.061)
	[0.010]	[0.026]
Voting Alignment × Alignment	0.013	0.094
	(0.096)	(0.068)
	[0.465]	[0.082]
Voting Alignment × Norms	0.041	0.113
	(0.086)	(0.066)
	[0.328]	[0.048]
Voting Alignment × Both	-0.093	0.007
	(0.096)	(0.070)
	[0.177]	[0.478]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.236	0.205
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.425	0.336
Linear Restrictions: Voting Alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.280	0.324
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.213	0.036

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Column 2 uses a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A58: Ink mark voting by voting alignment (female controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men (1)	All men (2)
Alignment	0.061	0.019
	(0.094)	(0.062)
	[0.271]	[0.393]
Norms	0.018	0.008
	(0.082)	(0.061)
	[0.424]	[0.465]
Both	0.247	0.134
	(0.097)	(0.066)
	[0.009]	[0.027]
Voting Alignment × Alignment	0.060	0.125
	(0.099)	(0.071)
	[0.288]	[0.046]
Voting Alignment × Norms	0.094	0.123
	(0.087)	(0.070)
	[0.151]	[0.041]
Voting Alignment × Both	-0.126	-0.001
	(0.101)	(0.074)
	[0.123]	[0.515]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.168	0.256
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.356	0.308
Linear Restrictions: Voting Alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.210	0.357
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.121	0.022

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Column 2 uses a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A59: Ink mark voting by voting alignment (male controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men (1)	All men (2)
Alignment	0.140	0.060
	(0.097)	(0.062)
	[0.071]	[0.166]
Norms	0.066	0.019
	(0.082)	(0.058)
	[0.218]	[0.385]
Both	0.146	0.111
	(0.095)	(0.065)
	[0.073]	[0.049]
Voting Alignment × Alignment	-0.023	0.075
	(0.102)	(0.071)
	[0.424]	[0.145]
Voting Alignment × Norms	0.043	0.112
	(0.087)	(0.067)
	[0.324]	[0.050]
Voting Alignment × Both	-0.016	0.027
	(0.100)	(0.073)
	[0.451]	[0.370]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1491	1491
# Households	1491	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.315	0.191
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.307	0.418
Linear Restrictions: Voting Alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.288	0.253
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.378	0.055

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Column 2 uses a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A60: Ink mark voting by voting alignment (ALL controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Some or all men (1)	All men (2)
Alignment	0.061	0.019
	(0.094)	(0.062)
	[0.273]	[0.390]
Norms	0.015	0.008
	(0.084)	(0.062)
	[0.444]	[0.467]
Both	0.254	0.141
	(0.098)	(0.066)
	[0.008]	[0.022]
Voting Alignment × Alignment	0.047	0.110
	(0.100)	(0.072)
	[0.335]	[0.064]
Voting Alignment × Norms	0.087	0.112
	(0.090)	(0.071)
	[0.176]	[0.060]
Voting Alignment × Both	-0.135	-0.012
	(0.103)	(0.074)
	[0.110]	[0.451]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.162	0.252
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.351	0.307
Linear Restrictions: Voting Alignment × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.186	0.437
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.140	0.030

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by women's stated misalignment with men of the household. At baseline, women were asked *"If elections were to happen today, do you think who you vote for will be the same party/candidate as the men of the household?"*. Column 1 reports heterogeneity by women's responses that they will vote the same as some or all men in the household. Column 2 uses a stricter definition of alignment and only consider voting with all men in the household as alignment. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.9 Heterogeneity analysis: Spillover effects on other members of household

Table A61: Intra-HH spillover effects (HH controls)

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.102	0.121	0.093
	(0.034)	(0.058)	(0.029)
	[0.002]	[0.033]	[0.004]
Norms	0.077	0.049	0.091
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)
	[0.016]	[0.344]	[0.020]
Both	0.112	0.091	0.123
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)
	[0.001]	[0.074]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2226	747	1475
# Households	1475	558	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.505	0.277	0.547
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.141	0.237	0.148

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A62: Intra-HH spillover effects (female controls)

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.115	0.103	0.110
	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.038]	[0.000]
Norms	0.102	0.015	0.099
	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.526]	[0.000]
Both	0.133	0.058	0.127
	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.030)
	[0.000]	[0.172]	[0.000]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	1450	635	1450
# Households	1450	510	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.661	0.274	0.663
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.028	0.239	0.028

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A63: Intra-HH spillover effects (male controls)

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.119	0.125	0.113
	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.029)
	[0.000]	[0.025]	[0.000]
Norms	0.079	0.036	0.101
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.029)
	[0.012]	[0.472]	[0.014]
Both	0.117	0.095	0.126
	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.029)
	[0.001]	[0.065]	[0.001]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2256	761	1491
# Households	1491	569	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.365	0.254	0.390
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.069	0.410	0.071

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A64: Intra-HH spillover effects (ALL controls)

Outcomes:	Individual turnout		Household turnout
	All women	Other women	Everyone voted
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alignment	0.103	0.113	0.097
	(0.033)	(0.057)	(0.030)
	[0.002]	[0.042]	[0.001]
Norms	0.077	0.040	0.089
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.030)
	[0.016]	[0.431]	[0.004]
Both	0.114	0.083	0.126
	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.031)
	[0.001]	[0.088]	[0.000]
Control mean	0.151	0.166	0.144
# Observations	2218	746	1372
# Households	1468	557	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.492	0.267	0.662
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.144	0.297	0.188

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on other eligible female voters in the household, including those who were not the main respondent for each household. The dependent variable for column 1 is female turnout of all eligible female voters in the household. Column 2 is the female turnout, subsetted to the other respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in the parentheses. Column 3 reports the household turnout with a binary indicator of whether everyone in the household voted or not. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. All models include block fixed effects. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.10 Heterogeneity analysis: Pessimism of male respondents

Table A65: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men (with HH controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.074	0.095	0.081
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.032)
	[0.018]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Norms	0.077	0.052	0.073
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.031)
	[0.013]	[0.080]	[0.011]
Both	0.117	0.131	0.107
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.032)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.103	0.007	0.129
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.081)
	[0.064]	[0.465]	[0.058]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.073	0.132	0.154
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.081)
	[0.147]	[0.021]	[0.033]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.048	-0.011	0.151
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.079)
	[0.260]	[0.445]	[0.043]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.514	0.162	0.335
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.305	0.474	0.162
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.387	0.158	0.325
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.048	0.156	0.059

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A66: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men (with female controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.086	0.102	0.087
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.033)
	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Norms	0.092	0.060	0.085
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.033)
	[0.004]	[0.061]	[0.006]
Both	0.121	0.136	0.111
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.034)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.113	0.032	0.161
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.078)
	[0.044]	[0.311]	[0.020]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.042	0.114	0.099
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.072)
	[0.261]	[0.033]	[0.090]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.045	-0.010	0.119
	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.074)
	[0.259]	[0.447]	[0.059]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1450	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.512	0.169	0.344
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.127	0.424	0.078
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.292	0.141	0.362
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.076	0.110	0.040

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A67: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men (with male controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.084	0.105	0.089
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.032)
	[0.010]	[0.004]	[0.003]
Norms	0.083	0.056	0.079
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.032)
	[0.007]	[0.065]	[0.007]
Both	0.115	0.124	0.105
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.033)
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.132	0.037	0.179
	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.076)
	[0.022]	[0.275]	[0.009]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.084	0.133	0.150
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.071)
	[0.098]	[0.015]	[0.021]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.062	0.018	0.151
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.072)
	[0.182]	[0.396]	[0.025]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1491	1491	1491
# Households	1491	1491	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.396	0.320	0.465
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.143	0.336	0.062
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.223	0.297	0.321
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.023	0.096	0.010

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

Table A68: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by pessimism of men (with ALL controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	Norms (1)	Alignment (2)	Both (3)
Alignment	0.083	0.099	0.084
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.034)
	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.006]
Norms	0.084	0.055	0.077
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.033)
	[0.010]	[0.077]	[0.011]
Both	0.120	0.136	0.110
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.034)
	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Men Less Pessimistic × Alignment	0.082	0.005	0.122
	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.084)
	[0.119]	[0.486]	[0.071]
Men Less Pessimistic × Norms	0.037	0.109	0.105
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.082)
	[0.317]	[0.049]	[0.108]
Men Less Pessimistic × Both	0.048	-0.015	0.142
	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.080)
	[0.261]	[0.425]	[0.051]
Control mean	0.144	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1372	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.517	0.165	0.336
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.192	0.463	0.134
Linear Restrictions: Men Less Pessimistic × Treatment (exact p-values)			
Alignment = Norms	0.262	0.117	0.406
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.172	0.169	0.178

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by men's pessimism about beliefs about norms (Column 1), alignment (Column 2), and both beliefs (Column 3). Men are considered less pessimistic if the size of their 'wedge' i.e. difference between their belief and actual belief about norms and alignment respectively is greater (less negative or more positive) than the sample-village median wedge. Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.1.11 Heterogeneity analysis: Knowledge of preferences of other members of HH

Table A69: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences (HH controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.021	-0.061
	(0.071)	(0.085)
	[0.406]	[0.246]
Norms	0.061	-0.062
	(0.067)	(0.083)
	[0.188]	[0.229]
Both	0.114	0.009
	(0.077)	(0.088)
	[0.068]	[0.479]
Know Preference × Alignment	0.097	0.185
	(0.078)	(0.091)
	[0.114]	[0.021]
Know Preference × Norms	0.042	0.181
	(0.074)	(0.089)
	[0.290]	[0.023]
Know Preference × Both	0.021	0.137
	(0.084)	(0.094)
	[0.413]	[0.079]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1475	1475
# Households	1475	1475
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.153	0.490
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.400	0.126
Linear Restrictions: Know Preference × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.157	0.347
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.102	0.012

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also them asked them 'We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men guess about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same. "

Table A70: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences (female controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.039	-0.053
	(0.072)	(0.086)
	[0.306]	[0.278]
Norms	0.072	-0.049
	(0.068)	(0.086)
	[0.148]	[0.287]
Both	0.121	0.008
	(0.079)	(0.089)
	[0.062]	[0.481]
Know Preference × Alignment	0.094	0.195
	(0.080)	(0.092)
	[0.123]	[0.017]
Know Preference × Norms	0.039	0.174
	(0.076)	(0.092)
	[0.307]	[0.033]
Know Preference × Both	0.017	0.144
	(0.086)	(0.094)
	[0.440]	[0.069]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1450	1450
# Households	1450	1450
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.224	0.495
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.479	0.154
Linear Restrictions: Know Preference × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.161	0.484
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.107	0.012

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also them asked them 'We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men guess about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same. "

Table A71: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences (male controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.040	-0.049
	(0.072)	(0.087)
	[0.302]	[0.293]
Norms	0.077	-0.050
	(0.069)	(0.085)
	[0.133]	[0.282]
Both	0.115	0.018
	(0.079)	(0.090)
	[0.071]	[0.438]
Know Preference × Alignment	0.097	0.193
	(0.079)	(0.093)
	[0.117]	[0.020]
Know Preference × Norms	0.034	0.177
	(0.076)	(0.090)
	[0.335]	[0.029]
Know Preference × Both	0.022	0.129
	(0.086)	(0.095)
	[0.413]	[0.097]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1491	1491
# Households	1491	1491
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.174	0.512
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.508	0.155
Linear Restrictions: Know Preference × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.144	0.330
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.119	0.012

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also them asked them 'We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men guess about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same. "

Table A72: Heterogeneity in voter turnout by whether HH members know each other's preferences (ALL controls)

Outcome: Woman Voted = 1	M know W's pref (1)	W know M's pref (2)
Alignment	0.038	-0.054
	(0.072)	(0.086)
	[0.311]	[0.274]
Norms	0.077	-0.050
	(0.068)	(0.087)
	[0.132]	[0.286]
Both	0.130	0.028
	(0.080)	(0.091)
	[0.051]	[0.398]
Know Preference × Alignment	0.080	0.183
	(0.080)	(0.093)
	[0.165]	[0.026]
Know Preference × Norms	0.019	0.165
	(0.077)	(0.093)
	[0.409]	[0.043]
Know Preference × Both	0.003	0.120
	(0.087)	(0.096)
	[0.502]	[0.114]
Control mean	0.144	0.144
# Observations	1372	1372
# Households	1372	1372
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.180	0.493
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.463	0.145
Linear Restrictions: Know Preference × Treatment (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.142	0.427
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.156	0.017

Notes: This table reports heterogeneity by knowledge of preferences within the household. In addition to asking respondents about their own support for women voting, we also them asked them 'We are also asking the question to the other respondent of your family. What do you think will be their answer?" Using this, we determine whether men guess about women's preferences match women's preferences (Column 1) and similarly, whether women correctly guess men's preferences (Column 2). Block fixed effects are included in all models. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same. "

K.2 IV results

We instrument the received treatment with the assigned treatment in Appendix A73.

Table A73: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness

	Woman Voted = 1 (1)	Man Allows HH Woman to Make Political Decision = 1 (2)
Alignment	0.116	0.046
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Norms	0.107	0.049
	(0.029)	(0.023)
Both	0.139	0.034
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Control mean	0.144	0.383
F-stat	4384.9	9395.0
# Observations	1552	4545
# Households	1552	1515
Linear Restrictions (p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.794	0.785
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.055	0.111

Notes: This table reports treatment effects from the instrumental variable analysis on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. The treatment received by the household is instrumented with the treatment assigned to the household. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.3 Enumeration pair fixed effects

Each household was assigned a single male and female enumerator - we define the combination of the two as an enumerator pair. We test robustness of main results to the addition to enumerator pair fixed effects in Appendix A74.

Table A74: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness

	Woman Voted = 1 (1)	Man Allows HH Woman to Make Political Decision = 1 (2)
Alignment	0.109	0.018
	(0.029)	(0.013)
	[0.000]	[0.178]
Norms	0.101	0.015
	(0.029)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.313]
Both	0.132	0.031
	(0.029)	(0.015)
	[0.000]	[0.030]
Control mean	0.144	0.383
# Observations	1548	4545
# Households	1548	1515
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.349	0.784
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.021	0.949

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block and enumerator-pair fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block, round, and enumerator-pair fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.

K.4 Limiting sample to compliant households

In Appendix A75, we only include households that received the correct treatment and answered the end line survey.

Table A75: Effects on Women's Turnout and Men's Permissiveness - non-missing throughout

	Woman Voted = 1	Man Allows HH Women to Make Political Decision = 1
	(1)	(2)
Alignment	0.109	0.041
	(0.030)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.078]
Norms	0.101	0.049
	(0.029)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.033]
Both	0.124	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.023)
	[0.000]	[0.198]
Control mean	0.150	0.383
# Observations	1472	4458
# Households	1472	1486
Linear Restrictions (exact p-values)		
Alignment = Norms	0.367	0.877
Alignment + Norms = Both	0.006	0.029

Notes: This table reports treatment effects on the two main outcomes - female voter turnout and men's decision to grant women autonomy in political decision making. In Column 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether women voted in the 2024 general election, which takes a value of one if their turnout was confirmed via the ink mark on their finger and zero otherwise. We include block fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. In Column 2, the outcome is a binary indicator of whether men would allow women to decide whether or not to donate money for a political gathering or not. Three versions of this question were asked - with no location of the political gathering mentioned and location of the political gathering specified as the house of a political ally or opponent. Column 2 reports combined results for all three questions; we control for whether the political ally question was asked first, include block and round fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. Exact p-values are reported in the square brackets. They are calculated using three sets of 5000 permutations each - in each set, the control group and one treatment arm are permuted while the other treatment arms remain the same.